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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present thesis is to trace the pragmat.ic 
method ot William James as one ot the fundamental themes ot his 
system of religious thought. It is evident that the religious 
system or James is a vast and circuitous field. An exhaustive 
treatment ot Jamests analysis ot religious consciousness would 
haYe to include pragmatism, pluralism, rad1cal empiric1sm, free 
will and the -finite god." 
The present thesis does not pretend to analyze James's entire 
treatment of religious consciousness. Attention will be centered 
on the pragmatic aspects of his religious thought; then special 
applications w111 be made to Jame8ts~religlous treatise, the 
'I£Att1es ~ Rel1g1oul lleer!!nce.l 
It will become evident that James's pragmatiC method in-
volves a very definite pragmatiC theory of truth. In the re-
ligious sphere, it will be shown that the pragmatic method and 
theory ot truth are connected with the crucial doctrine ot the 
w111 to believe. Thus James's religious pragmatism revolves around 
lwilliam James, 1''(1 vatietlet .2( Relj.giou. Exp!rlepce: ! §tu9I !!1 Human N,;t;ure ew ork, 1902 ) • 
1 
2 
three hingee or cardinal pointe of' reterence. First, there is 
the pragmatic method. Second, there is the pragmatic theory at 
truth. Third, there is the will to believe. A fruitful dis-
cussion or James's religious pragmatism must look into these three 
cardinal pOints and explore the connections between them. 
The path to be tollowed 1s clear. The subsequent chapters 
will sketch (l) the pragmatic method of James; (2) the pragmatic 
theory ot truth; (3) the will to believe, and (4) the pragmatic 
elements as manifested in Ih! Vat&tt;el st Ba.1g1oul Elp!riIDcl. 
The first three topice will be treated rather briefly and as an 
introduction to the Vatilx;'I- The pragmatic elementa in the 
Il£iet1e, will be discussed more at length. The result of the 
inquiry w111 be a deeper understanding of the pragmatic method 
aa a strong undercurrent in the religious thought of William 
James. 
CHAPTER II 
JAMES'S PRAGV1ATIC METHOD 
Tbe pragmatic method 1s the first ot three cardinal points 
ot reterence 1n James'. religious pragmatism. What do.s James 
mean by the pragmatic method? 
!be most h1ghly-de.eloped statement ot the pragmatic method 
18 contained in James' 8 book, l!Euml~'Mt pubUahed in 1907.1 
There he tella U8 that the pragmatic method 1. primarily a method 
0.1 settling metaphysical dispute. that otherwise could be inter-
minable. "The pragmatic method in such cases is to try ~ inter-
pret each notion by traoing ita respective practical cons.quences. 
What difference would it pract1cally make to anyone it this 
notion rather than that notion were tru.,·2 It one can trace no 
" 
practical difference whatever, then the alternative. mean prac-
tically the same thing. 
B.rore proceeding to a further delineation ot James'a prag-
matism, it is necessary to point out that his account ot prag-
matism in 1907--while clear and tinal--was not his first statement 
lWilllata James t ~'D1at1'DU ! New Name ..tq[ Some lli Ways 9l.. 
1'h1pkJ.PI (New York. 1 . • 
2~.t p. 45. 
, 
on the subject. It would be illogical to apply a doctrine d.-
veloped only in 1907 to the Iat1!$i" which was published in 1902. 
the ditf'iculty doe. not materialise. however, when one real-
11e. that James's first lengthy public statement on pragmatism 
occurred in lS98--four yeate betor. the publication ot the 
Vl£1l\l... The occasion wae an addr.ss to the Philosophical Union 
ot tbe Univeraity ot California.) In thi. addre •• James expressed 
hie indebtedness to Charl.s S. P,irces 
I wUl seek to define. wi th you merely wbEt t 8eems to be 
the most likely direction in which to start upon the trail 
of truth. Years ago this direction was giv.n. to m. by an 
Americanphi1osopher whose home i8 in the East, and whose . 
published workS, tew a8 they are and soatter,d 1n periodicala. 
are no tit expression of his powera. I refer to Mr. Charle. 
s. Peirce, with whoee •• ry .slatence .s a phIlosopher I 
dare say manr or you are unacquainted. H. 1& one of the 
Boat origina of oont .. porary thinkers; and the prinCiple 
ot practicallsm--or pragmatism, as he called itt when I 
fir.' heard. him enunoiate it at Cambridge in the early 
'70'a--18 the clue or compass by toll owing which I find 
mY8e11' more and more oont11"118d :in believing we may keep our 
teet upon the proper trail.'" . ., 
It 1s evident from this quotation that Jame8 did not regard him-
selt as the originator of pragmatism. It i8 also clear that 
Jam.s definitely espoused pragmatism in 1896. and heard about it 
betore 1675. 
Analysi. must now be made of several essential ideas con-
tained in James's important statement ot 1898. Theae essential 
'William James, .Philosophical Conceptiona and Practical 
Results," in g21119~19 lasils !BS "vi,ws (New York, 1920), 
pp. 406-4.37. 
4llUa •• p. 410. 
, 
ideas will recur in the Varieties (1902) and in Pragmatism (1907). 
Peirce maintained ~hat the soul and meaning ot thought is 
alwaY8 directed. towards the production ot beliet. Beliet is the 
concluding beat which ends a musical phrase in the symphony of 
mants intellectual lite. lor Peirc., beliets are really rule. 
tor action. The wbole !unction ot thinking is but one step in 
the production ot habits of action. "It tbere were any part ot 
a th~ght that made no d1fterence in the thought's pract1cal con-
.equencea, then tbat part would be no proper element of the 
thought'a significanoe.'" The ..... thought may be clad in differ-
ent worda, but if the difterent words suggest no difterent con-
duct, they are .ere aocretions and do not change the meaning. 
It a m8ft w1sh.. to attain pertect olearness in h1s thoughta ot 
an object. he need only conaider what ettecta or a conceivably 
practical kind the object may involv.--what senaations can be 
" 
expected and what reaotions may occur; Manta conception of these 
ettects is ~he whole of the conoeption of the object. 
These thoughts or Peirce seemed acceptable to James with a 
slight qualification, James insists that the principle ot Peirce 
should be expressed with a more encompassing view ot tuture 
exper1 eno. I 
The ult1mate test for us ot what a t~th means is indeed 
the conduct it dictates or inspires. But it inspires that 
conduct because it first toretells some particular turn to 
our experience which shall oall tor just that conduct trom 
6 
us. I should prefer tor our purposes this evening to express 
Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of 
any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to 
some particular conseqtience, in our future practical experi-
ence l whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the ract that the experience mus! be particular, than in 
the fact that it must be active. 
Thus in 1898 James definitely adopted the central position 
of the book, fragmatism, which was to appear in 1907. Suppose 
that there are two different philosophical propositions which 
seeM to contradict each other. and about which men dispute. If 
one supposes the first proposition to be true, and can foresee 
from it no oonceivable practical consequence different from what 
would be foreseen if the truth of the other were supposed, then 
the difference between the two propositions is specious and verbal. 
If, however, the two propositions have distinct practical conse-
quences, then they take on vital meaning in lnan's struggle through 
life. 
For example, theism and materiali'am do have distinct prac-
tical consequences in man's experience. For James, simple ra-
tional argumentation does not solve the constant struggle between 
theism and materialism. One must look to the particular conse-
quences flowing from the acceptance of theiSM or materialism. 
Materialism 1s not "a permanent warrant for our more ideal inter-
ests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes."7 The notion o.f God, 
6Ibid., p. 4.12. 
7Ibig., p. 422. 
7 
on the other hand, guarantees an ideal order that shall be perma-
nently preserved. "A world with a God in it to say the last word, 
may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of Him as still 
mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fru-
ition; so that where He is, tragedy is only provisional and par-
tial. and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final 
things,HS The materialist is really denying that the moral order 
is eternal, and cuts off ultimate hopes; the theist is really 
affirming an eternal moral order with definite hope of ultimate 
victory in the life-struggle. These are the distinct practical 
consequences of theism and materialism, 
The essential ldeas of Jamests pragmatism of 1898 have now 
been sketched. They coincide with the central thought ot EI!i-
matism which was published nine years later. During those nine 
years James thought over his fundameqtal pragmatic norm and gath-
" 
ered examples and further argumentation to back up his pOsition. 
Attention must now be centered on the book Pragmati!! in an attempt 
to gain deeper understanding of the pragmatic method as understood 
by James. 
James's own suggestion is pertinent here. "To take in the 
importance of Peirce's principle. one must get accustomed to ap-
plying it to concrete cases. w9 Chemists have long discussed the 
619id., p. 42). 
9W1l1iam James, Prru;matism, p. 48. 
inner constitution of certain tautomeric bodies. (Tautomerism 1n 
general is the phenomenon shown by certain substances of possessiD@ 
more than one chemical structure). Some chemists said that an 
unstable hydrogen atom oscillated inside of the tautomeric bodies; 
other scientists maintained that these bodies are unstable mixturee 
of two bodies. But this dispute is really no dispute at all, says 
James, since no particular experimental fact can be made different 
by one or the other view being correct.lO 
One may also apply the pragmatic method to the free-will 
problem. What does free will mean pragmatically? uFree-will 
pragmatically me&lS novelties in ~ worlg, the right to expect 
that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, 
the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past. nll 
Thus free will becomes a general cosmological theory of promise 
for James. It is a melioristic doctrine. Man with a free will 
can struggle along towards possible iniprovement. Determinism 
breeds pessimism and sings the sad refrain thut necessity and 
impossibility alone rule the destinies of the world. Both free 
will and determinism. take on vi tal meaning since they have dis-
tinct practical consequences. 
Consider the philosophical notion of substance. James again 
leans towards empirical analysis and applies the pragmatio method. 
lO~bid •• p. 49. 
lllb1d., pp. 11$-119. 
9 
A piece of chalk has substance in the sense that you can pick it 
up, teel its powdery texture, see the whiteness and break it into 
several pieces. This is the pragmatic meaning ot the substance 
of chalk. 
In this way each notion is to be interpreted by tracing its 
respective practical consequences. For James, many philosophical 
disputes collapse into insignificance the moment one subjects them 
to this Simple test of traCing a concrete consequence. There is 
no difference in abstract truth that does not express itself in 
a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that 
fact. "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out 
what definite difference it \'Iill make to you and me, at definite 
instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula 
be the true one."12 
Pragmatism represents the empiricist attitude in philosophy. 
Yet it does not insist on any special" results. The pragmatist 
supposedly turns away from abstraction, verbal solutions, fixed 
prinCiples, closed systems and pretended absolutes. "He turns 
towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action 
and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and 
the rationalist temper sincerely given up_"l) 
Man must bring out of each word its practical cash-value and 
12Ibig.., p. 50. 
l)Ibid 
-" 
p. 51. 
10 
set it to work within the stream of his experience. Theories 
become instrwnents. not static answers to problems in which one 
ce:m rest secure. Prag'Il1atism is predominantly anti-intellectualist. 
It agrees with nomi:lalism in appealing to particulars. It empha-
sizes practicl aspects with utilitarianism. It steps with posi-
tivism in its disdain for verbal solutions and metaphysical ab .. 
stractions.. PraglJ.1atiSlll is fully armed and militant against ra-
tionalism as a pretension and as a fi'lethod. l4 
At this pOint of the inquiry James was quite logical. For 
lllany pages he had been insisting on the pragmatic method. "One 
must interpret each notion by tracing its practical consequences." 
But why must one do this? James saw quite clearly thr.t the prag-
matic method was valid only if a pragmatic theory of truth were 
argued to and established. It made no sense to trace practical 
consequences unless one already main1:iained that truth is that 
" 
which has practical consequences. All men desire truth and con-
sistency. rtum t s mind goes out after truth. Therefore, thought 
James. real truth must be pragIl1c.:.tic truth, since practical con-
sequences are the vital determining element for a real philosophy. 
Attention must now be centered on the pragm; __ tic theory of 
truth which is the logical background for the pragmatiC method and 
the second cardinal pOint in Jar116S' s religious pragmatism. 
CHAPTER III 
JMI£S'S THEGd! OF TRUTH 
James begins with the disan11ng statement that truth is the 
agreement of certain of man's ideas with reality.l But what is 
meant by agreement with reality? The popular notion is that a 
true idea must copy its reality. A man shuts his eyes and thinks 
ot the clock on the opposite wall. He forms in his mind a true 
picture or "copy" of the clock's dial. It is eVident, according 
to James, that the copy-theory ot truth does not cover all the 
cases; it is too crude and limited. 
The great assumption of the "intellectualists" is that truth 
means essentially an inert static relation. A man gets a true 
idea, fulfills his thinking destiny, :'and that is the end 0.' the 
" 
matter. According to the intellectualists man thus arrives at 
an epistemological state of stable equilibrium. 2 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its customary question. 
Grant an idea or beliet to be true--what concrete difference will 
its being true r.lake in anyone t s life? What human experiences will 
be different from those which would obtain it the belief were 
lJames, Pragmatism, p. 198. 
2Ibig., p. 200. 
11 
12 
talse? What is the truth's cash-value in terms ot experience? 
Answers to these questions will constitute James's position on 
truth: "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, 
corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. 
That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true 
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all 
that truth is known-as_") 
Thus truth for James is not a stagnant property inherent in 
the idea conceived. Truth is something thQt happens to an idea. 
The idea becomes true; is Illade true by subsequent events. The 
truth of an idea becomes a process of verification and validation. 
Man's ideas "agree" with reality in the sense that they have 
certain practical consequences which can be verified and validated 
in reality, This agreement is not an instantaneous act, but is 
an extended process of leading and g~iding one idea into harmo-
nious connection with other parts of man's experience. 
The possession of true thoughts means the possession of in-
valuable instruments of action.4 One need not EO too deeply into 
human lite to realize the usefulness of having true beliefs about 
matters of tact. Truth can be &ld is eminently useful for man. 
Falsehood can be very harmful. It 18 a primary human duty to 
pursue true 1deas--ideas which will connect with experience and 
)Ibid., p. 201. 
4Ibid' t p. 202. 
13 
can be verified sometime in the future. Truth once possessed is 
not an end in itself, but is only a preliminary means towards 
other vital satisfactions. 
Analysis will now be made of a very homely example sketched 
by James. It will throw important light on the subjective element 
in the pragmatic theory of truth. 
If I am lost in the woods and starved and find what looks 
like a cow-path. it is of the utmost Lnportance that I should 
think of a human habitat~on at the end of it, for if I do 
so and follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful 
here because the house which is its object is useful. The 
practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from 
the practical importance of their objects to us. • •• True 
is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, 
useful is the name for its canpleted function in experience. 
True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would 
never have acquired a class-name, least of all a name sug-
gesting valui, unless they had been useful trom the outset 
in this way.' 
In these simple words the true is connected with what is useful, 
and "the useful" becomes an integral"part ot what is true. But 
personal usefulness is evidently a sub'jecti ve element and i8 not 
objectively the same for all men. The man in James's example 
tinds it useful to toll ow the path because he thinks of the pos-
sible useful object at the end ot the path. But another man might 
willingly wait at that particular spot, and find it useful to con-
serve his strength and see which way the cows go home. A third 
man, a criminal, might find it eminently useful to race away into 
the forest to avoid detection. James maintains that the true is 
the useful, and the useful is the true. Therefore each mants 
course of action, since it 1s individually useful, is true and 
valid. Truth becomes a matter ot what each man finds userul in 
a particular situation. It is difticult to avoid the conclusion 
that James's theory of truth 1s predominantly subjective. 
Pragmatism always looks upon truth as something essentially 
bound up with the way in which one moment ot man's experience 
leads on to another moment. It is always a leading process--
working on to what is useful or worth-while to the individual 
person. "When a moment in our experience, of any kind whatever, 
inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that sooner 
or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars 
ot experience again and make advantageous connexion \<lith them. "6 
Pragmatic truth ultimately connects man with what is advantageous 
and useful. 
James poses the problem of whether every truth perceived by 
man must be directly and actually verified. Conslder again the 
man looking at the clock on the opposite wall. Is it true that 
the clock is real and tells correc~ time? Actual verification. 
ot course. would answer the question. One could walk over to 
the clock, touoh it, open it and examine the inner workings. Then 
it would certainly be true. But human life would collapse into 
insanity it a person demanded actual direc~ verification for every 
6 ~ •• p. 205. 
lS 
common-sense truth of daily life. James solves the problem by 
stating that truth lives on a sort of credit system of verifica-
tion. Man sees the clock on the wall and lets his notion pass 
for true without attempting to verify it. He knows that the notion 
could be verified if the necessity ot actual verification should 
arise. Truths mean verifioation-processes essentIally, but in-
direct and possible verifications are also included. In the credit 
system of truth, man accepts many facts and truths without direct 
verification. Such truths are not actually verified. but they 
can be verified. -This all points to direct face-to-face verifi-
cations somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses 
like a finanCial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept 
my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on 
each other's truth. But beliefS verified concretely by somebody 
are the posts of the 'whole superstructure.-? 
Description of the pragnlatic theory of truth haa been rocused 
up to this point on matters of fact an. ordinary external objects 
~t daily life. Has pragmat1sm anyth1ng to say about purely mental 
~deas and relations between mental 1deas? Very definitely. 
Pragmatism maintains that true and talse beliefs also obtain 
~n the sphere of purely mental conceptions. 8 One plus one makes 
two. White differs less from gray than it does trom black. When 
7Ibid., pp. 207-208. 
8Ib1d., p. 209. 
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the cause begins to act, the effect also begins. The mental 
objects here are absolute and unconditional. Call them defini-
tions or prlnciples-.in any case they are perceptually obvious at 
a glance. No sense-verification is necessary for such principles. 
Once they are true, they are always true. Truth in this mental 
world is legitimately eternal. 
Yet even in the realm of mental relations, truth is also an 
affair of leading. One abstract idea leads up to another, and 
extensive fruitfUl systems of logical and mathematical truth are 
formed. One logical conclusion brings on another and the new 
resultant is then applied back into the stream of sensible experi-
ence. Theory and fact join together and work correctly because 
the very structure of mants thinking works correctly and leads to 
a sign1ficant result. 
Truth, 1t was said, means agreement with reality. What does 
the word "reality" include? This reality can be of three kinds, 
according to James. First, reality can mean the concrete facta of 
daily experience. Second, reality includes properly formed ab-
stract ideas and the relations perceived intuitively between them. 
Third, reality means the ~nole mass of truths already in man's 
possession.9 
What does the word "agreement" mean? James gives, as might 
be expected. a pragmatic interpretation of the word, "agreement." 
17 
It has already been stated that the copy-theory of truth does not 
work in all cases--how could the human mind "copy" such ideas as 
power. past time, beauty and spontaneity? A wider interpretation 
of agreement is needed. "To I agree t in the widest sense with a 
reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or 
into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with 
it as to handle either it or something connected with it better 
than it we disagreed."lO Agreement, in other words, is nothing 
but the pragmatic leading and guiding. The essential thing about 
agreement is the process of being guided. An idea agrees with a 
reality when it fits practically or conceptually vdth the reality. 
An idea agrees with a reality when it helps man to deal success-
fully with the circumstances and situation connected with the 
reality. An idea agrees with a reality when it adapts manls whole 
life to the reality's setting and su~rounding connections. To 
agree means ultL~ately to successfully"follow out a process of 
practical verification: "Agreement thus turns out to be essentially 
an affair of leading--leading that is useful because it is into 
quarters that contain objects that are important. True ideas lead 
us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly 
up to useful sensible termini. • •• In the end and eventually, 
all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying 
sensible experiences somewhere, which somebody's idea. have 
10 ~ •• pp. 212-213. 
18 
copied. ttll 
Thus a pragmatist interprets agreement as any process of con-
duction from a present idea to a future terminus, provided only 
the process runs smoothly and prosperously. Pragmatism wants a 
theory which will work. Man's true idea must mediate between all 
previous truths and certain new experiences. Common sense and 
previous belief must be disturbed a8 little as possible. The 
ultimate goal is always 80me sensible terminus or other that can 
be verified exactly. Jau"les sums up his descri.ption of truth with 
the statement that "truth in science is what gives us the maximum 
possible sum of satisfactions, taste included. but consistency 
both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most 
imperious claimant. • •• Truth for us is simply a collective 
name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, 
etc., are names for other processes qonnected with 11fe, and also 
" 
pursued because it pays to pursue theDr. tt12 One can say that a 
man is healthy because he digests and sleeps well--or one can say 
that a Iuan digests or sleeps well because he is healthy. In like 
manner one can say that something is true because it is practi-
cally uaeful--or it is practically useful because it 1s true. For 
James, both statements mean the same thing. 
Briefly put, "the true" is the expedient in the way of man's 
llIbid., p. 215 
12Ib1d., pp. 217-218. 
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thinking just as "the right" is the expedient in the way of man's 
behaving.l) That is true which is expedient in the long run and 
on the ~{hole in view of whatever experience one has had up to the 
present moment. New experience may come along and force man into 
a new set of truths. There is no absolute and eternal truth in 
mants practical experience. Abstract principles are eternally 
true in the abstract, but they too have to be applied in the always 
changing stream of practical experience. The pragmatist must be 
ready for new experience which will very likely shift one's stock 
of present truths. One must live by the true today, but be ready 
to call it falsehood tomorrow. "Aristotelian logic and scholastic 
metaphysics were expedient for centuries, but human experience 
has spilled over those limtts, and we now call these things only 
relatively true, or true within those borders of experience. 'Ab-
solutely' they are false; for we kno~ that those limits were 
" 
casual, and might have been transcended by past theorists just as 
they are by present thinkers."14 
Thus pragmatism holds out for a potentially better truth 
which will occur in the future and will always work towards greater 
concreteness of fact. The truth man has today is adequate only 
for today and will be improved by the experience of tomorrow. Man 
works on towards the future goal of absolute truth while building 
l)~ •• p. 222. 
14 ~., p. 223. 
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on the wide stock of half-truths already in possession, Truth is 
not something set, definite and unchangeable. Rather it is fluid, 
half-formed and improving all the time. Certain truths are con-
cluded from todayts facts; but these truths have to dip back into 
the next day's experience and new fund of facts. Man's obligation 
to acknowledge truth is not unconditional. Concrete truths in 
the plural need be recognized only when their recognition is ex-
pedient. Truth is a duty only when it is related to the practical 
situation at hand. Truth grows in somewhat the same manner as a 
rolling snowball increases its size. Truth is pertinent when it 
is recognized as expedient for man in a particular situation. lS 
The connection between the pragmatic method and James's theory 
of truth 1s now evident. The pragmatic method insists that each 
notion is to be interpreted by traCing its practical consequences. 
But this traCing of practical consequences makes sense only it 
"that is true and meaningful \\thich has" useful practical conse-
quences." In other words, the pragmatic method makes sense only 
when it is grounded in a well-established pragmatic theory of 
truth. The pragmatiC method and the pragmatic theory of truth do, 
in fact, bolster and interpenetrate each other in what one could 
call James's pragmatic view of experience. 
The will to believe and its related pragmatiC elements must 
now be discussed. 
15 Ibid., p. 2)2. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE WILL TO BELIEVE 
James's doctrine on the will to believe is the third cardinal 
point of reference in his religious pragmatism. The first. two 
topics--the pragmatic method and theory of truth--have already 
been discussed. A sketch must now be attempted of the will to 
believe and its connections with the pragmatic theory ot truth. 
The first part of this chapter will consist in a description or 
the doctrine of the will to believe. Then certain connections 
between the pragoatic theory ot truth and the will to believe will 
be discussed. 
What, then, 1s the document called "The Will to Believe"? 
It is "an essay in justification ot faith, a defence of our right 
" 
" 
to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters. in spite ot 
the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been 
coerced. wl It is James's discussion of the scope and validity of 
the voluntary religious faith ot man. The original address, "The 
Will to Believe," was delivered at the Philosophical Clubs ot Yale 
and Brown Universities in 1896. The book, The !ll! !,q Believe, 
lWilliam James, The Will to Believe. and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy ,New 'I'Ork;" IB<i?), pp. 1=2. -
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was published in 1897 and contained, of course, the thirty-one 
page essay, "The Will to Believe," as well as important related 
essays which had appeared earlier. These were "Is Lite Worth 
Living" (1895), "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1880); "Reflex 
Action and Theism" (laSl); "The Dilemma ot Determinism" (1884); 
and "The Moral. Ph1losopher and the Moral Life" (1891). The ear-
lier essays, especially "Is Life Worth Living," lead up to and aid 
in the understanding ot James's later doctrine of the will to 
believe. 
James begins his defense of voluntarily adopted faith with 
explanations of the terms involved. The terms "hypothesis" and 
"option" are to be carefully described, since they play such an 
important part in the thesis of the will to believe. An hypothesls 
is an~hing that can be proposed to man's belief. A live hypoth-
esis is one that appeals as a real pO:,ssibility to him to whom it 
is proposed. Deadness and liveness in" hypotheses are not inSig-
nificant instruments to be thought of as intrinsio qualities. 
They are crucial relations to the individual thinker. Deadness 
and liveness are to be measured by the person's willingness to 
act. It a proposition is greatly alive for an individual, then 
that individual is willing to put himself out--to act irrevocably. 
In addition, if a person is ready to take positive action in 
accordance with the propOSition, then it practically means real 
beliet in the proposition. 2 
2, 
What is an option? An option is the decision to be made be-
tween two hypotheses. A living option is one in which both hy-
potheses are live one8. "It I say to you: 'Be a theosophist or be 
a Mohawnedan t ' it is probably a dead option. because for you nei-
ther hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: 'Be an ag-
nostic or be a Christian,' it is otherwise: trained as you are, 
each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small. to your beliet."' 
A ~rced option i8 one that is not avoidable. That is, one 
is taced with a dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction 
with no possibility ot not choosing. An exanJple would be: "Either 
accept this truth or go without it." 
A ~omentous option is one that involves a unique opportunity, 
a significant personal stake and an irreversible decision. It i8 
in no way trivial. 
It 1s important to realise what :.James means by a ,enuin. 
" 
option, since only a completely genuine option is to be resolved 
by the will to believe. The notion includes three definitions 
already given. A genuine option is one that is living, forced, 
and momentous. In other wards, a genuine option involves two live 
hypotheses, cannot be avoided, and is a question of a significant 
personal stake in a unique situation. 
As an introduction to the actual thesis of t.he will to be-
lieve, James proceeds to an analysis ot the actual psychology of 
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human opinion and conviction.4 Does the intellect always operate 
according to the pure light of logical evidence with very little 
help fram the passional and volitional nature? Or do mants pas-
sional and volitional convictions lie at the root of most of his 
convictions? 
Consider the first possibility--that the intellect operates 
pretty much alone. Certain tacts seem to give foundation for this 
statement. For eX&rilple, a man reads a reliable historical account 
of the lire and career of Abraham Lincoln. The intellect perceives 
~he evidence and accepts the essential facts about the existence 
of Lincoln. It would seem in this case that the mind has no need 
of :nan's passional or volitional nature to attain to a con"iction. 
~incoln was objectively there whether the man reading the history 
wishes to believe it or not. 
Consider a man with ten dollars 1n his pocket. His mind knows 
that ten dollars are there and no more. Again, it is evident that 
no amount of mere volition will make the ten dollars a hundred 
~ol1ars. Man's objective opinion here is that there are ten dol-
~ars in the pocket. This opinion is not modifiable at will. The 
~ll neither helps nor hinders the intellect in its grasp ot this 
~vid.nce. In this case, too, it would seem that the intellect 
grasps the objective evidence with little help from the will. 
Certain writers bring forward Pascal's wager as an acceptable 
~ase of the will's impulse overriding the intellect. But James 
urges caution here. Not all that Pascal says is looked upon fa-
vorably by James. Yet it must be said that certain elements in 
Pascal's wager are not too far rer~ioved from James f s own doctrine 
ot the will to believe. Pascal's wager is presented in the lan-
guage of a gaming-table: 
You must either believe or not believe that God is--which will 
you do? Your human reason cannot say. A game is going on 
between you and the nature of things which at the day ot judgment will bring out either he~ds or tails. Weigh what 
your gains and your losses would be if you should stake all 
you have on heads, or God's existence; if you win in such a 
case you gain eternal beatitude; it you lose, you lose 
nothing at all. If there were an infinity of chances, and 
only one for God in this wager, still you ought to stake your 
all on God; for though you surely risk a finite loss by thts 
pracedure, and finite loss is reasonable even a certain one 
is reasonable, if there is but the possibility of infinite 
gain. Go then, and take holy water. and have masses said; 
beliet will come and stypefy your scruples,--Q.!.!! vous !!£! 
9ro~re !! yoU! AP!ttra.' 
James correctly remarks that the frank terms ot Pascal's wager 
constitute a rather extreme position .and are not Pascal's only ar-
guments in tavor of the Christian religion. But it Pascal's wager 
is accepted, it is an example of man's will strongly influencing 
a certain conViction where the reason cannot arrive at a definite 
logical conclusion. Few men would be moved to act by the sheer 
~l1-power of Pascal's wager. For most men the hypothesis offered 
by Pascal is not a live one. "It 1s evident that unless there be 
some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, 
the option offered to the will by Pascal cannot be said to be a 
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living option. tt6 
From one point of view, then, it seems silly and vile to be-
lieve by the effort of volition alone. The whole history and tenor 
of the scientific method seem to add weight to the conclusion that 
objective evidence is all that counts. At first glance, it would 
seem that mants mind must submit to the facts independently of 
the will's impulse. 
Yet mants non-intellectual nature does influence his convic-
tions according to James. In typical fashion. James has given a 
moving and partially convincing description ot a widely-held opin-
ion, and then proceeded to disagree with it. Man's mind must have 
ev1dence-- ftyet it ~~y one should thereupon assume that intellec-
tual insight is what remains after wish and will and sentimental 
preference have taken wing, or that pure reason is what then set-
tles our opinions, he would fly quite as directly in the teeth ot 
the facts.·7 
It is quite true that man'a willing nature cannot resurreot 
and give existence to certain hypotheses. It cannot resurrect 
them because they are already dead. And they are already dead be ... 
cause the Willing nature has already acted directly against them • 
...,ive hypotheses. on the other hand, can be accepted and strength-
fened by man's willing nature. 
6Ibid •• p. 6. 
7Ibide. p. S. 
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What is meant by mants willing nature in this context? The 
term, as usual with James. is rather v~;ue and far-reaching. It 
includes direct acts of the will as well as emotional and environ-
mental factors. fear, hope, prejudice and passion. Even social 
pressure and imitation have a legitimate place here. In fact, 
willing nature seems to mean all the forceful non-intellectual 
pressures and motives brought to bear upon a man as he faces a 
particular choice. 
The exposition of the terms and context ot James's doctrine 
of the will to believe is now cOlTlplete. James's central thesis 
can now be set down. "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, 
but must, decide an option between propositions. whenever it is a 
genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual 
grounds; for to say, under such circumstances J f Do not deci.de, but 
leave the question open.' is itself a:. paSSional decision,--just 
" 
" like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of 
losing the truth. n6 The statement is now clear. Man's paSSional 
nature must decide an option between propositions when two impor-
~ant conditions are verified. First, it must be a question ot a 
~enuine option--that is, one that is living, forced and momentous. 
Second. the option cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. If 
a man refuses to decide the option in these circumstances, says 
James, he is no better otf than the man who goes ahead with a 
8 Ib~d •• p. 11. 
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choice. The decision not to ohoose proceeds also from man's non-
intellectual nature and involves the risk of loss of truth. 
The doctrine of the will to believe does not pretend to answer 
systematic skepticism. The reasonable mind works on the postulate 
that there is truth and that it is the destiny or man to attain 
it. It a XU&n chooses to believe in no truths at all because be 
fancies that there are none, then the will to believe has no place 
in his thought life. 
The will to believe is a valid empirical approach in man's 
pursuit of true beliefs. In the history of philosophy there have 
been two approaohes to true beliefs, according to James. There is 
the empiricist way of believing in truth and there is the abso-
lutist way.9 James, of course, prefers the empiricist approach to 
truth while he classifies scholastic philosophy as one of the ab-
solutist systems. 
" 
The absolutists say that man not only can attain to a know-
ledge of the truth, but he can know when he has attained it. The 
empirioists would maintain that although man can attain to truth, 
he cannot infallibly know when he has it. The empiricist tendency 
has largely prevailed in science, while the absolutist tendency 
has had its way in philosophy. Each rationalist philosopher thinks 
that his own system is the eternal closed system. Each rationalist 
philosopher thinks that he has the ultimate certitude--while other 
thinkers have only partial truth. Scholastic orthodOXy has beau-
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titully and clearly evolved the doctrine about objective evidence, 
and as a matter of tact. each thinker in the diverse philosophical 
systems thinks that he has attained the necessary "objective evi-
dence. tt Yet it is an extreIllely difficult task, in an absolutist 
system, to aotually attain to the eagerly desired certitude and 
objective evidence. The thoughts and concepts of the ab,solutist, 
while beautiful in the abstract, fail to touch the practical level 
of human experience. 
Complete empiricism is the mental background tor the will to 
believe. Empiricism is. for James. the only sensible philosophical 
path to true beliefs. "Objective evidence and certitude are doubt-
less very tine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and 
~am-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore, myself a 
~amplete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. ttlO 
~ must always go on experiencing and thinking over his experi-
" 
enoe. In this way his opinions can become more and more true. 
Most of the opinions of man can and will be reinterpreted and cor-
rected in the course of experience. Truth grows as man's experi-
9nce grows. "There is but one indefectibly certain truth. and 
~hat 1s the truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves stand-
~ng,--the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness 
~xist8.ttll All other truths are not final and closed. They must 
lOlbig., p. 14-
llIbid., pp. 14.-15. 
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be reinterpreted and corrected in the tuture. 
At this point it is possible to see the connection between 
the will to believe and the pragmatic theory ot truth. When a 
person possesses sufficient empirical data ar~ can properly evalu-
ate the practical consequences, the pragmatic theory ot truth is 
to be applied. ~~en the available evidence is non-empirical or 
incomplete, the will to believe is in order. The will to believe 
helps tovdrds a solution of a genuine option when the intellectual 
grounds for a decision are not adequate. But the pragmatic theory 
of truth maintains that truth is not yet complete or fully veri-
fied. In certain types of problems. absolute certitude and com-
pelling objective evidence are not yet there. The full intellec-
tual and empirical background for a dec1sion is not yet prepared. 
Frequently, then, man cornes face to face with a genuine option 
without the necessary intellectual background tor a decision. Go 
" 
" 
right ahead. says James. Make the decision. Let the strong im-
pulses of your non-intellectual nature carry you along. Whether 
your decision is right or wrong will gradually become clear in 
the course of future experience. The will to bc!l1eve mUf3t first 
make the choice which the pragmatic theory ot truth will then 
.fully and finally verify. No infallible signal sounds to proclaim 
to inan that now at last he has the full possession of a true be-
lief. He makes his decision, forms his mind for the time being, 
and then looks towards the correcting thoughts and experience of 
the future. The will to believe is thus eminently empirical and 
)1 
pragmatic in that it looks to the outcome and total future drift 
of man's thinking to see if a cart·; in position be valid and true. 
In other words, the will to believe and the pragmatic theory ot 
truth work together. At first a direct solution ot a particular 
problem is attempted by means ot the pragmatic theory ot truth. 
It empirical data and practical consequences are insufficient or 
lacking, recourse can be had to the will to believe. Selections 
and options ot the will to believe must, in turn. be ultimately 
tested and purified by the pragmatic drift ot man's future experi-
ence. 
The valid use of the will to believe does not mean that man'. 
non-intellectual nature is to run wild. It does not mean that man 
is not to be eminently intellectual and rational in the ordinary 
business of life. The will to believe is validly used only in 
the face of a genuine option--one that is living, forced and mo-
mentous. Rather often the option between losing truth and gaining 
it is not momentous. In such a case one can wait. On less impor-
tant choices man can wait for objective evidence and refuse to 
~ake up his mind until it has come. Such is the usual procedure 
in most scientific questions and in the ordinary human affairs of 
each day. In trivial matters, the need of acting is seldom so 
urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at 
a11.12 
12 l!2.!sl., p. 20. 
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But when it is a question ot truth concerning objective nature 
one cannot decide promptly just to get the matter out of the way. 
The proper understanding of objective nature and the problems of 
science is not trivial but philosophically momentous. Yet this 
does not mean that we are to use the will to believe tor the solu-
tion of every scientific experiment. An option in the realm of 
8cience may well be momentous, but even here it is seldom a ques-
tion ot living hypotheses and a forced decision. In most scien-
tific experiments the mind must maintain an attitude ot skeptical 
balance. The objective evidence is to be caretully sifted and 
thought over. 140st of the options in the realm of science are not 
forced and can wait for further testing and validation. "Let us 
agree that wherever there is no forced option, the dispassionately 
judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving us, as it does, 
from dupery at any rate, ought to be DUT ideal_-l ) 
The great questions of life, of course. are speculative, not 
scientific. Inquiry must now be made into some of the momentous 
speculative problems of life in an effort to see possible and even 
unavoidable applications of the will to believe. If living, forced 
and momentous options are found among these speculative problems. 
and if the intellectual evidence is not sufficient, then the will 
to believe has an important role to play in this crucial field. 
Moral questions, of course, are high up On the list of the 
1) 1914., PP. 21-22. 
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cruoial speculative problems of life. The deeply perplexing de-
cisions faoed in the moral field are momentous, living and, in 
many cases, forced. They fall under the will to believe. The 
intelleotual evidence 1s not always there. yet one cannot wait 
around collecting evidence and postponing moral decisions indefi-
nitely. Therefore the will and heart of man, not the strict ra-
tionalist attitude, are to settle crucial moral questions. "A 
moral question is a question not of what sensibly eXists, but of 
what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell 
us what exists; but to compare the worti!. both of what exists and 
of what does not exist, we must consult not sCienoe, but what 
Pasoal calls our heart. ,,14 It is man's will and total paSSionate 
nature which decide whether moral beliefs at all are to be ac-
cepted. "It your heart does not ~ a world of moral reality, 
your head will assuredly never make you believe in one."l; 
" 
Another momentous speculative problem is the problem ot man's 
religious belief. James works his way into this topic by pointing 
out that belief in a fact will sometimes help create that fact. 
In the ordinary personal relationships of daily lite a man sees 
that his faith in a certain fact helps to bring that fact into 
existence. The man who really wants to succeed in a particular 
venture, who firmly believes that he can succeed, has already 
14Ibid., p. 22. 
lSlbi~. t p. 23. 
.. --'-. 
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taken a significant step down the road to success. His faith, 
confidence and expectation have helped him overcome the fUndamental 
hurr!an inertia to be faced in a difficult situation. Man's desire 
for a certain kind of truth actually helps to bring about the ex-
istence of that truth. In a certain sense, faith in a certain tact 
or outcome can produce or partially determine that fact or outcome. 
James has cautiously led up to the principle that "faith in 
a tact can help create the fact." This is true, says James, in 
certain practical situations of life. But can this idea be used 
1n the religious field' Does faith in a fact help to create the 
fact in a matter of religious belief? And does the related doc-
trine of the will to believe have a valid function in establishing 
man's religiOUS belief? 
James's answer to both questions is in the positive. The very 
purpose of the essay, "The Will to Believe." is a justification 
" 
ot roants religious belief--a belief which cannot be intellectually 
proved according to James. But what is the "religiOUS belief" 
which James repeatedly mentions in this essay of 16971 The re-
ligious belief of this essay is very vague, and differs somewhat 
trom the more extensive doctrine to follow in Ih2 Varieties g! 
ReligiouS iXper!ence in 1902. The succeeding chapter of the pres-
ent thesis will delineate some of Jamests rambling notions of 
religious belief to be found in the Varieties. In lS97. however, 
James tells us that "religion says essentially two things. First 
she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the 
overlapping tenngs, the things in the universe that throw the last 
stone, 50 to speak, and say the final word. • •• The second at-
firma:t,ion of religion is that we are better off even now if we 
believe her first affirmation to be true. n16 
Should a man accept thia affirmation of religion? Is the 
religious hypothesis valid? Apply the will to believe, says James. 
First, is the religious hypothesis a living option for you? If 
not, proceed no further. If religion is a totally dead option for 
you, then neither intellectual evidence nor the will to believe 
will resurrect your beliefs. You are a moral skeptic and must go 
your own way. 
If, on the other hand, the religious hypothesis is a live 
option, then you go on to the next question. Is man's acceptance 
of religiOUS belief momentous or trivial for him? Obviously it 18 
a question of a momentous option with a Significant, even an eter-
nal personal stake in the matter. 
Is the option forced? Is the decision unavoidable? Or can 
one wait and hope for more light and evidence? James maintains 
that the option in the face of the religious hypothesis is 
irorced.1? Man must choose one way or the other. Man cannot rea-
sonably refuse to choose. The presumption is that nct too much 
additional conVincing evidence will be brought to light in the 
16Ibid" pp. 25-26. 
1? J;Rid., p. 26. 
... 
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future. Man gains nothing by waiting. To hold off a decision in 
this question of religion is to choose skepticism. The skeptic 
who insists on waiting does not really avoid an option. He has 
taken the positive position that it is better to risk loss of eter-
nal truth than stake a chance on temporary error. Since the intel-
lectual evidence will never be complete, the man who does not 
accept the religious hypothesis is definitely against it. There 
is no middle ground here. Man's trustful acceptance of the reli-
gious hypothesis with his willing and passionate nature is a pro-
cess that does the deepest service to the universe. This use of 
the will to believe is not blind or unreasonbble. It is simply 
the use of the instincts and courageous drives of the heart in a 
case where the intellect is inadequate. Man is not to jump ahead 
and believe the patent superstitions offered by many selt-appointe~ 
religious teachers who come along. A patent superstition is ob-
" 
" 
viously a dead hypothesis and cannot tall under the will to be-
lieye. The freedom to believe covers only living options which 
the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve.18 
Thus man must use the will to believe to attain to true be-
liets in the field of religion. The belief that religion is true 
is of crucial importance since beliet is measured by action. Be-
11et in a life of religion will help to create a life of religion. 
The man who accepts the fundamental religious hypothesis w1l1 act 
18 Ibid. J p. 29. 
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differently from the man who founds his life on naturalistic belief 
alone. The absolutist says: Wait and use the intellect to form 
a perfectly rational choice in the light of the objective evidence 
which will surely come. The empiricist, with both feet on the 
ground, says. Choose now. The intellectual evidence will never 
be complete. Let your heart, instincts and courage help you in 
this crucial decision. You can lose nothing. You can gain all. 
Whether you are right or not will become clear in the course ot 
experience. 
This acceptance ot religious faith is the one thing that can 
destroy pessimism. The pessimist trembles at the brink of life 
and wonders whether lite is worth living. In tact, the whole 
human lite-situation i8 like a man who, while mountain-climbing, 
has attained a precarious position and can escape only by means of 
a terrible leap.19 The pessimist in .'. this l1fe-a1 tuation falters; 
" 
" does not project a strong faith in the religious hypothesis and. 
as a result, 1s lost. The optimist realizes the risks involved, 
projects a strong faith and takes a courageous leap--knowing that 
his very confidence is a partial cause of success. In short, man 
is to believe that life is worth livir~, and this very beliet will 
help create the fact. 
Here again the will to believe and the pragmatiC theory ot 
truth work hand in hand. Man's personal belief that life is worth 
19 l!21!!. t p. 59. 
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living has the practical psychological consequence that life actu-
ally becomes worth living for this person. Since such belief has 
this practical consequence, it is true and pragmatically valid. 
Attention must now be focused on certain pragmatic elements 
in James's extensive religious treatise, In! Varieties £! Reli£ioue 
Experience. 
CHAPTER V 
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
The three leading ideas of James's religious pragmatism have 
already been sketched. They are the pragmatic method itself, the 
pragmatic theory of truth and the w ill to believe. 
An attempt will now be made to show how these leading ideas 
manifested themselves in, and influenced the V,rietie§. The main 
problem 1s a problem of length. The Var1et1e§ is a long treatise--
conSisting in the Gifford lectures on natural religion delivered 
at Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902. Twenty leetures and a postscript 
are included in the book. James's analysis of religiOUS thinkers 
and various religious experiences ranges far and wide and is not 
always free from prejudice. Careful s,~lection of certain 'concepts 
and examples must be made. The prime objective is to get a clear 
understanding of the spirit and letter of James's teaching in the 
Varieties and to grasp the strong pragmatic undercurrent in much 
of the argumentation. Procedure in this chapter will be as fol-
lows: first, a major religious concept, practice or example used 
by James will be accurately stated. Then, if additional treatment 
1s required, certain prat,1':1atic elements will be pointed out and 
explained. The purpose of this chapter 1s really the pw-pose of 
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the entire thesis: to see the inrl uence of prag~:latism in the re-
ligious thought of William James. 
The Varieties is, for the most part J a psycholog:i cal descrip-
tion of mants religious constitution. James originally planned 
ten descriptive lectures on "Man's Religious Appetites" to be fol-
lowed by ten metaphysical lectures on "Their Satisfaction through 
Philosophy." But James obviously became absorbed in the psycho-
logical descriptions and explanations of man's personal experience 
of religion and let this occupy him through most of the twenty 
lectures. This does not stop him, however, from giving philosoph-
ical analyses and conclusions from time to time. 
The vague concept or religion presented in the Will ~ Believe 
bas already been pointed out. In the second lecture of the 
V!£i!ties James tells us that religion consists in "the feelings, 
acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far 
as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divine."l The vague concept of the!!!! 12 
Believe has become somewhat particularized. By the time James 
works his way through to the twentieth lecture of the Varieties, 
be is ready to draw the conclusion that religion includes three 
particular beliefs and two psychological attitudes or character-
istics. This complex conclusion is vitally important. It comes 
towards the end of the Varieties, but is the mental background and. 
lJames t Varieties, p. 31. 
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supposedly, the net result of all of James's religious analysis. 
It throws much needed light on the whole previous treatise. 
Religion, then, includes three beliefs. First, the visible 
world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its 
chief significance. Second, union or harmonious relation with 
that higher universe is mants true end. Third, prayer or inner 
communion with the spirit of the higher universe--be that spirit 
"God" or "lawtt--is a process wherein work is really done, and 
spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or 
material, within the phenomenal world. In addition to these three 
beliefs, religion also includes two psychological characteristics. 
First, there is a new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, 
and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to 
earnestness and heroism. Second, there is a personal conviction 
ot salvation and peace joined to feelings ot love towards other 
men.2 
Already one can sense the pragmatiC and empirical overtones. 
"Prayer 1s a process wherein work is really done. Spiritual 
energy flows in and produoes eftects." Man teels a new zest and 
lives his lite with peace and safety. This attitude 1s almost 
identical with that of the man who courageously uses the will to 
believe. The one using the will to believe believes that be will 
not fail and is able to pour himself out in energy and positive 
activity. Such energy and activity help the man along the road to 
success and builds the conviction that life is actually worth 
living. A man's life becomes peaceful and meaningful because he 
has embranced religious belief. Thus religious beliet tends to 
verify itself by the peaceful harmony and dynamic conviction which 
follow. 
A remark by James in the first part of the opening lecture 
is quite significant and has sometimes been forgotten by later 
critics. "I am neither a theologian, nor a scholar learned in the 
history of religions. nor an anthropologist. Psychology is the 
only branch ot learning in which I am particularly versed. H' The 
approach to religion in the Var~etie8 is largely psychological. 
James's best work here is psychological. He gives the impression 
ot honestly trying to find out the actual psychological state of 
the person under discussiom But his ever inquiring and 1nter-
" 
ested mind could not always stop here. From time to time he dips 
back into the causes of the person's psychological state and at-
tempts to sketch the philosophical foundation which must be at the 
root. He thought very highly of the pragmatiC theory of truth and 
presupposed it or flashed back to it frequently as the only rea-
sonable mental bam~ground for any problem. It is not that he 
wished to directly connect pragmatism and religious consciousness 
for the length of twenty lectures. Rather he delineated the care-
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tully select.ed evidence he could find for roan's religious experi-
ence and when the time came to attempt a philosophical analysis. 
pragmatism seemed the only theory that could explain the facts. 
In other words, James was expressly and directly a psychologist; 
but he could not help being, at least implicitly and indirectly, 
a confirmed pragmatist. 
James is also an empiricist in his religious treatise. The 
procedure is not to argue from set principles and evolve a closed 
system which will stand forever. Many documents and extensive 
evidence are to be sifted and evaluated. James attempts to ana-
lyze and grasp the mind of the people who, supposedly, are most 
accomplished in the religious life and best able to give an in-
telligible account of their psychological state and motivation. 
He 1s not interested in the ordinary religious believer whose 
religion is largely a matter of imitation and social habit. He 
hopes to analyze persons who have pursued religion exclusively--
who have set the pattern and had the original experiences in a 
certain field of religion. It is true that the exclusive pursuit 
of the religious life does tend to the exceptional and eccentric. 
But this 1s due, no doubt, to an exalted emotional sensibility 
joined with vurious types of deeply felt inner conflicts. The 
method is always empirical. Gather facts. Sift through examples. 
See what conclusions can be drawn from the many test-cases. 
A common phenomenon in spiritual history is the conflict be-
tween what is immediately good and what is finally good. It is 
.. 
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evident that man regards same states of mind as superior to others. 
The superiority does not derive from some antecedent organic con-
dition such as the liver's fine condition or the relaxed state ot 
the nervous system. 14an looks upon certain states of mind as su-
perior neither because we take an immediate delight in them; or 
else it is because we believe them to bring us go()d consequential 
fruita for life. n4 One criterion of mental states--iwmediate de-
light or inner happiness with an idea--is manifested to the in-
dividual as something good. The other criterion--serviceability 
tor man's needs and conSistency with other oplnlons--leads to what 
is true. Yet these two criteria are frequently in conflict. What 
is immediately delightful to the individual may appear good here 
and now. but will not be good in the long run because it is not 
true. Drunkenness may be immediately delightful; but it is not 
a true and meaningful state of mind because it does not bring par-
" 
manently good fruits for life. This is the eternal conflict be-
tween what appears immediately good and what is true and good in 
the total course of experience. This conflict leads up to much 
confusion and uncertainty in man's spiritual judgments. What is 
good in the present situation is not always what is good in the 
long run. 
Many great theological thinkers have had to face this confli~ 
and struggle against their own neurotic te:nperament at the same 
4-Ibig., p. lS. 
time. But their thinking is not to be condemned merely because of 
the neurotic temperament. The only real criteria of theological 
thinkiI~ are immediate luminousness, philosophical reasonableness 
and moral helpfulness.; All theology must submit to these tests. 
It does not matter whether you are talking about Saint Paul, George 
Fox or Saint Teresa. Their theology stands or falls according 
to the above~entioned norms. More important, the above-mentioned 
norms fade back into the pragmatic norm itself. A thing or idea 
is luminous, reasonable and morally helpful when it leads on to 
practical consequences. Thus the final test of any belief is not 
ita origin, but the way in which it works on the whole. "By their 
fruits ya shall know them, not by their roots."6 Henoe. it is not 
enough th,,;t a religious experience have, or claim to have, an 
origin in supernatural revelatiOfi., personal intUition, pontifical 
authority or direct spiritual communication. A religious experl-
" 
ence is true and valid if it has good practical results. James 
includes an interesting quotation fron! Saint Teresa's Autobi2S· 
raRhr which allegedly maintains the identical position. A vision 
or apparent heavenly favor is true if it is followed by good dis-
positions in the recipient. "A genuine heavenly vision yields 
to the soul a harvest of ineffable spiritual riches, and an ad-
mirable renewal of bodily strength. I alleged these reasons to 
5Ibid., p. 18. 
6 lJ2.is1., p. 20. 
those who so often accused my visions ot being the work of the 
enemy of mankind and the sport ot my imagination. • •• I showed 
them the jewels which the divine hand had left with me:--they were 
my actual dispositions."? 
James is primarily interested in personal, not institutional 
religion. Personal religion centers interest on the inner dispo-
sitions ot man himself with his conscience, his helplessness and 
his incompleteness. Institutional religion supposedly stresses 
worship and sacrifice, theology, ceremony and eccleSiastical or-
ganisation. For James, worship and sacrifice are nothing but 
procedures for working on the dispositions of the deity and are 
lees worthy ot attention. Institutional religion ie primarily an 
art, "the art ot winning the favor ot the gods."S Personal re-
ligion goes direct from heart to heart, from soul to soul, be-
tween man and the divine. 
.' 
aeligion is simply the feelings, acts and experiences of man 
in relation to the divine. But what is the "divine"? The divine 
is any object that is godlike whether it be a concrete deity or 
not. In personal religion, the divine is the primal reality to 
which the individual feels impelled to respond in a solemn and 
grave manner. The d1vine, 1n other words, is definitely related 
to man's emot1onal experiences of solemnity. Since 1t 1s related 
?Saint Teresa, Autobiogra2hx, as quoted by James 1n The 
Var;ftties, p. 21. 
SJames, Var1eties, p. 29. 
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to something emotional in man, the divine can never be clear-cut 
and sharply drawn. It can be present in a greQter or less degree. 
The pragmatic connotations of James's description of the 
divine are eVident. The divine is that which prompts solemn re-
actions in the individual. Always the real meaning ot any word is 
to be grasped by an analysiS of the particular consequences. Thus 
the word "divine" means pragmatically that which is capable ot 
producing a personal reaction of emotional solemnity. The emo-
tional solernnity leads on to a Kind of deep religious happiness 
which is not just a buoyant feeling of escape. Deep religious 
happiness faces the fact that there is in the world an evil, nega-
tive and tragic principle worKing against man.9 This evil prin-
ciple is the negative side of religious life against which many 
of the outstanding religious thinkers have struggled. A man re-
mains solemn in the tace of the struggle; but fundamentally happy 
" 
" because he knows that a courageous struggle will lead on to vic-
tory. All human lite has its sacrifice and surrender whether 
voluntary or otherwise. A life of religion embraces these sacri-
fices graciously and even makes them a positive ingredient of 
permanent happiness. "Religion thus makes easy and felicitous 
what in any case is necessary; and if it be the only agency that 
can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human fac-
ulty stands vindicated beyond dispute.. It becomes an essential 
organ of our life, performing a fUnction which no other portion 
of our nature can so successfully fulfill."lO 
James's explanation of religious conversion will lead us di-
rectly to the pragmatic theory of truth. Conversion in general 
is the process, gradual or sudden, by which "a self hitherto di-
vided and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified 
and consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its 
firmer hold upon religious realities."ll Conversion is an inner 
alteration of personality from one way of life to another. It 
is not just a temporary change of viewpoint. It is a total trans-
formation of the person's lite-aim in such a way that previous 
aims or tendencies are definitively expelled. Most men have an 
habitual center of personal energy--a focal point of the actual 
aims and conscious ideas which motivate lite for the time being. 
A person devotes himself to, and works from the group ot key ideas 
" 
" 
whioh torm the central motivating force in his conscious life. 
When religiOUS conversion occurs, the person changes the habitual 
center of his personal energy. At one moroont the conscious guid-
ing ideas are pursuit of pleasure and advancement of the self 
while religious considerations remain peripheral. At another 
moment. atter conversion, the conscious guiding ideas are reli-
gious while other less worthy motives become peripheral. The 
lOlbid., p. 51. 
11Th"", ld9 ~'t p.o. 
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conscious center of.' character and personality has changed to a. 
new level. In the mental life of man there are many levels and 
depths of.' conscious and subconscious forces of character. In re-
ligious conversion the latent religiOUS aims and ideas rise to 
the conscious surface and become dominant characteristics of the 
personality. The less worthy considerations which had been domi-
nant sink back to the depths--never. perhaps. to return. Conver-
sion is thus an evident shift in the central motivating forces ot 
consciousness. "To say that a man is 'converted' means. in these 
terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his con-
SCiousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form 
the habitual center of his energyJa2 
Why does mants center of personal energy shirt? Why do the 
new religious motives become dominant? The explanation is twofold. 
First; there are the explicitly consdious processes of thought and 
" 
" 
will which lead up to the point of conversion. This is the con-
scious preparation for conversion and, in the long run, is of sec-
ondary importance. Second, there are the subconscious or sublim-
inal incubation and maturing of motives which are deposited by 
the experiences of life. The important word here is subliminal. 
The religious motives and ideas are not all consciously perceived, 
but having once entered, they do their work silently and beyond 
the field of actual consciousness. After a sufficient process of 
12 Ibid., p. 196. 
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incubation, the maturing religious motives burst forth into the 
field of actual consciousness a.nd gr:-eatly affect the religious 
conversion. Some writers, according to James, call this process 
a miracle or a manifest outpouring of divine grace. More often 
than not, it is simply the motives of the subliminal field of con-
sciousness intruding upon and overcoming the person's emotional 
center of energy. 
A religious conversion is to be judged by the fruits follow-
ing upon the conversion. The significance and value of a human 
event o~ condition must be decided on empirical grounds exclu-
sively. Conversion, no matter how sudden, is a human oondition 
and must be judged on empirical grounds. "If the fruits to£ !.!.!':!. 
of the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize and ven-
erate it, even though it be a piece ot natural psychology; if not, 
we ought to make short work with it,:no matter what supernatural 
" 
being may have infused it. Mll In many cases ot sudden conversion 
the fruits for life are not really permanent. This is due to the 
tact that sudden converts usually have an exaggerated emotional 
sensibility, a tendency to automatisms and a very active and 
highly developed subliminal self. Such characteristics are not 
ordinarily consistent with a permanent change in the habits of 
life. The exaggerated emotional sensibility and nervous instabil-
ity aid the process of conversion but do not help to stabilize the 
l)Ibi~., p. 2)7. 
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practical life-habits which follow. 
A true and lasting conversion has, as its permanent fruit, 
the characteristic called saintliness. Real saintliness is the 
practical fruit and only valid criterion of a genuine religious 
conversion. The saintly character is the one for which spiritual 
emotions are the habitual center of the personal energy. The dis-
tinguishing characteristics of saintliness are the same for all 
religions.14 Saintliness includes four inner conditions of soul 
and is followed up by four practical consequences. 
What are the four inner conditions of saintliness? The first 
condition is the intellectual and sensible conviction of the ex-
istence of an Ideal Power. This conviction includes the feeling 
ot transcending the small selfish interests of the world and 
living in a wider and more worthy life. The Christians personify 
the Ideal Power and call it God; however. moral ideals, civic uto-
pias and inner religious visions can Serve as the Ideal Power. 
Tha second inner condition of saintliness is na sense of the 
friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own lite, and a 
Willing self-surrender to its control. nlS The third inner con-
dition 18 a deeply ielt elation and freedom which is the result ot 
the lessening of selfish personal interests_ The fourth condition 
is the shifting of the emotional center away from the selfish ego 
l4-Ib1d 
--, pp. 271-274._ 
p_ 273. 
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and towards loving and harmonious feelings with regard to others. 
These tour inner conditions ot saintliness have the following 
tour practical consequences: asceticism, strength of soul, purity 
and charity. Asceticism is closely linked with the passion for 
selt-surrender and sometimes goes so tar as total selt-immolation. 
Asceticism leads the saint on to a positive pleasure in sacrifice 
as an expression ot loyalty to the Ideal Power. Strength ot soul 
is linked with the, teeling ot enlargement ot life. The soul at-
tains a new level ot patience and fortitude while the ordinary 
personal motives and anxieties tade away. The soul is strong and 
fearless in the face of the always pressing difficulties ot lite. 
Purity is conneeted both with asceticism and with onets feeling 
of closer union with the Ideal Power. Tbe soul becomes sensitive 
to spiritual discords. Brutal and sensual elements appear vulgar 
and repulsive. Weakness of the flesh is beaten into submission. 
" 
.' 
Charity is the concrete working out ot the shift of the emotional 
center away from the self. Tenderness tor others is fostered. 
The eyes are closed to all motives of hate and distrust. Every 
beggar is the saint's brother. 
U~timately, then, saintliness is to be judged according to 
these practical consequences: ascetiCism, strength of soul, purity 
and charity. These qualities are to work together in proper pro-
portion. In genuine saintliness no Single quality is overempha-
sized to the detriment of the others. These four I practical con-
sequences, in harmonious proportion, are the criteria ot a true 
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and meaningful saintliness. 
Saint Aloysius Gonzaga is, for James, an example of an exces-
aive passion for purity. "I will let the case of Saint Louis of 
Gonzaga serve as a type of excess in purification. I think you 
will agree that this youth carried the elimination of the external 
and discordant to a pOint which we cannot unreservedly admire. n16 
From a tew citations taken from Meschler's beautiful biography 
ot Saint Aloysius, James attempts to argue that the saintliness 
of Aloysius had no practical fruits or consequences. A long di 
quotation from Meschler is taken from the chapter, "The Cradle of 
Holiness" which supposedly covers the career of saint Aloysius 
around the age of ten.1? This chapter 1s only the tourth chapter 
of forty-four chapters in the book, yet a quotation from it is 
chosen by James to prove that the saintliness of Saint Aloysius 
was definitely unbalanced. In this quotation a picture is sketc 
, 
ot a ten-year-old boy who took a vow ot chastity, avoided the 
companionship of women, kept his eyes east down and regularly prac 
tised unusual austerities. James carefully selects further brief 
quotations to reinforce the supposed picture of a neurotic child 
not interested at all in social righteousness. Aloysius was, sup-
posedly, all tied up in his own little self and did nothing to 
l6Ibid., p. 3S0. 
17Maurice Mescbler, S.J., Life 2! iain~ Altystus Gonzaga: 
fitron gl Christian YOuth! trans:-by a ene tct ne 01 the Perpet-
ual Adoration (tondon, 19 1). Pp. 34-35. 
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help others around him. "When the intellect, as in this Louis, is 
originally no larger than a pin's head, and cherishes ideas of God 
of corresponding smallness, the result, notwithstanding the heroism 
put forth, is on the whole repulsive. Purity, we see in the obj~ 
lesson, is not the one thing needful; and it is better that a life 
should contract many a dirt-mark, than forfeit usefulness in its 
efforts to remain unspotted_"IS James'. prinCiples here are clear, 
even though the total argumentation does not tollow from the case 
of Saint Aloysius. The example chosen is unfortunate and does not 
tit at all. The pragmatist principle is that one judges a life by 
looking to the practical consequences or truits manifest in that 
life. It is strange that J&mes, with his empirical temper and pas-
sion for facts. did not take the trouble to glance through to the 
end of Meschler's biography_ There he would have found out that 
Saint Aloysius did not die at the age or twenty-nine, as James 
" 
seems to think. His "unsocial" and "useless" Aloysius died in 1591 
at the age of twenty-three atter personally caring tor victims of 
the plague in two Roman hospitals,19 James's handling of Saint 
~loysius is distorted, but is not to be ascribed to anti-Jesuit 
~rejudice. "Other early JeSUits, especially the missionaries among 
~hem, the Xaviers, Brebeurs, Jogues, were objective minds, and 
tought in their way for the world's welfare; so their lives today 
18James, V![ieties, p. 354. 
l~schlerf S.J., Life 9i. Saint Aloysius, pp. 2')8-256. 
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inspire us. ,,20 
James's principle always remains the same. Religion and 
saintliness are to be tested by a human judgment concerning the 
practical consequences to follow. "The gods we stand by are the 
gods we need and can use, the gods whose demands on us are rein-
forcements of our detlands on ourselves and on one another. What 
I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by 
common sense, to use human standards to help us decide how far the 
religious life commends itself as an ideal kind of human activ-
ity.n21 It is a case of the "survival of the fittest" applied to 
religious beliets. If religious beliefs work will in the face of 
~uman needs and experiences, they are to be accepted. If a reli-
~ious belief does not work well, does not fit the current human 
needs, then it must be rejected. 
James repeatedly maintains that .one of the prime factors in 
religion is the conviction or feeling that some sort of Ideal Power 
pr God exists. 11l8.D. has an emotional sense which pOints to the ex-
~8tence of same sort of' envelopin& divine being. But is this erno-
~ional sense objectively and philosophically true? Can the truths 
~:f religion be completely and convincingly proven by human reason 
~lone? Which is more important for the religious lite of man--
reeling or strict philosophical proof? 
20James, Varieties, p. 354. 
21Ibid., p. 331. 
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Feeling is the deeper source of religion for James, Philo-
sophical and theological formulas are not completely useless, but 
must be classes as socondary products in the field of religion. 
Feeling and unreflective sentiment are the primary and important 
factors in religion, "In a world in which no religious feeling 
had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology could 
ever have been framed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual con-
templation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need 
of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, 
would ever have resulted in religiOUS philosophies such as we now 
possess.,,22 Theological speculations are mere "overbeliefs and 
buildings-out" of the intellect into a field already delineated 
by strong religious feelings. There can be religion without the-
ological speculation, But there can be no religion without reli-
gious feeling. Religious feeling iscsomething dumb, personal and 
" 
mysterious, Philosophy, on the other hand, attempts to be clear-
cut, brutally objective and eternally unchangeable. It is always 
simple, noble, clean and rigorously logical. James makes light 
ot what he calls "intellectualism" in religi.on. Religious intel-
lectualism tries to construct religious objects out of the resour-
ces of logical reason by itself. It uses non-subjective facts 
and general principles in an A priori fashion. The intellectualist 
despises individual reeling in the field ot religion. Yet real 
22 ~., p. 431. 
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individuality is founded in feeling. The really significant facts 
of human character are not found in the world of the generalizing 
intellect. One must look to the deeper recesses of feeling and 
to the darker, half-hidden strata of human consciousness. 
How does James supposedly discredit the intellectualist ap-
proach to religion? As usual, he makes use of a pragmatic crite-
rion.23 The claims of natural theology must be tested by the 
actual subsequent experience ot men in history. A genuine the-
ology based on pure reason must convince men universally. It 
claimato be objectively convincing. Therefore one need only in-
vestigate whether the logical reason's approach to religion has 
actually been objectively convincing to the majority of men. Phi-
losophy assures us that its conclusions are unchangeable and will 
free us from personal caprice and waywardness. Yet it is philos-
ophy whicb forms sects and schools, and perpetuates differences 
between thinking men. The philosophical approach to God has simply 
not been universally convincing. James's main conclusion is that 
the logical reason helps to bring on religious conviction only if 
the person already wlsbis to believe_ "I believe, in tact, that 
the logical reason of man operates in this field of divinity ex-
actly a8 it has always operated in love, or in patriotism, or in 
politics, or in any other of the wider affairs of life, in which 
our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. 
23 1!:Wt-. p. 4)6. 
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It finds arguments for our conviction. for indeed it has to tind 
them. n24 Intellectual arguments for religion are cogent only for 
the person who is already favorably disposed towards, and emotion-
ally inclined to religion. The person who already believes in God. 
finds that intellectual arguments confirm his conviction. Intel-
lectual arguments are not sufficient for the person who does not 
wish to believe. 
At this pOint the connection between the will to believe and 
James's analysis of religious experience is again evident. ~mn 
cannot rationally and logically prove the hypotheses of religion. 
Yet the hypotheses of religion cannot be ignored. They are too 
momentous to be neglected. Godts existence, while impossible to 
demonstrate intellectually, can be handled properly by the will to 
believe. Man must decide whether his lite will be influenced by 
a possibly existing divine being. The option for or against God 
" 
is certainly forced. live and momentous. Yet the intellectual evi-
dence is insufficient. This does not matter, says James, because 
personal feeling and emotional inclination are the primary factors 
of religious experience. Intellectual proofs and formulations are 
secondary. The will to believe with its use ot man's paSSional 
nature will make up for the lack of intellectual evidence in the 
tace of the religious hypothesis. 
But is there a lack of intellectual evidence for relieion? 
'9 
How does James attempt to show that one cannot prove the existence 
of God? He briefly mentions the arguments from causality, design, 
S con sensu gentium, and the argwllent .from the moral law which 
"presupposes a lawgiver." By way of disproof James modestly as-
serta that "l will not discuss these arguments technically. The 
bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled either 
to scout or to neglect them shows that they are not solid enough 
to serve as religion's all-sufficient foundation. Absolutely im-
personal reasons would be in duty bound to show more general con-
vinCingness. n25 James is willing to follow the "idealists" when 
they call into question the existence ot God. He seems to forget 
that in many other sections of his writings he criticizes the ide-
alists for being abstract. overly rational and "out of touch ,,11th 
concrete reality." One 1s almost tempted to suppose that James 
is a victim of his own theory of bel,ief. James derini tely wanted 
to believe that the existence of God could not be intellectually 
demonstrated, so he cast about for a clever argwnent which would 
bolster his anti-intellectualist conviction. His refutation of 
causality in religion is probably the shortest in the history of 
philosophyt "Causation is indeed too obscure a principle to bear 
the weight of the whole structure of theology.n26 
The argument from deSign is supposedly demolished by Darwin. 
25~ •• p. 437. 
26lB1£l. 
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There is no such thing as a consistent theological order in the 
universe. Order 1s a purely human invention. Nature and the uni-
verse are like a table upon which a thousand beans have been 
thrown. Man comes along; he can pick up a certain number of beans 
and leave an apparent orderly pattern on the table. Thus the only 
real order is supposedly man-made. Much of the world is nothing 
but an infinite anonymous chaos.Z7 Man must believe in God first. 
This belief is an emotional leap through intellectual mist and 
darkness. Once a man believes in God, the intellectual proofs 
will come along and confirm his belief. By themselves, the intel-
lectual arguments for God prove nothing rigorously. 
In the eighteenth lecture of the Varieties James reiterates 
the prinCiple of pragmatism as the great norm by which all reli-
gious experience is to be judged. Z8 He again gives full credit 
to Charles Sanders Peirce as the real originator of the prinCiple 
in its present form. Every difference must make a difference; 
every difference in theory must issue somewhere in a difference 
ot practice. The whole validity and truth ot a thought is deter-
mined by the thought's practical consequences. 
James then applies the principle of pragmatism to the attri-
butes of God to again show how it works in the religious field. 
The metaphYSical attributes of God are unacceptable because they 
27Ib1d., PP. 438-439. 
28Ib1d., PP. 443-44S. 
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have no practical consequences. The moral attributes, on the other 
hand, are acceptable because they have definite practical conse-
quences. 
First, the metaphysical attributes. Ood's asaity, immateri-
ality, simplicity, actualized infinity, self-sufficiency and self-
love are supposedly destitute of all intelligible significance. 
"How do such qualities as these make any definite connection with 
our lite? And if they severally call for no distinctive adaptions 
of our conduct, what vital difference can it possibly make to a 
man's religion whether they be true or false? • •• Even though 
these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive ot 
its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any 
one ot them should be true."29 
With the moral attributes it is another case altogether. 
"Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They 
positively determine fear and hope and 'expectatIon, and are roun-
dations for the saintly li£e."'O God is holy, so He can will noth-
ing but what 1s good for us. God is omnipotent, so He can secure 
the triumph of what is good. God knows all things, so He can see 
us 1n the dark. God is loVing, so He can pardon us. God is un-
alterable, so we can count securely on Him. These are all quali-
ties which have a practical connection with human life as it is 
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lived from day to day. Therefore, these qualities are meaningful. 
But beware, says James, of attempting to demonstrate intellec-
tually even the moral attributes of God. They simply cannot be 
proved by the force of pure and logical reason. Such intellectual 
arguments mean nothing to the man who is deeply and emotionally 
disturbed about some fundamental relieious question--the problem 
of evil, for example. Reasoning in the crucial problems of the 
theological field always remains something superficial and unreal. 
Reasoning does not touch the heart of the matter. A man must first 
get some sort of experience of God and take the courageous leap of 
belief in God. The intellect is never quite sure of itself in the 
religious field. nAn intellect perplexed and baffled, yet a trust-
f'ul sense of presence--such is the situation of the man who is 
sincere with himself and with the facts, but who remains religious 
still. ,,31 
Man's confession ot personal sins "is also to be evaluated 
pragmatically. The impulse to confess one's wickedness in the 
sight of God is one of the fundamental sentiments of religion. It 
1s a valid impulse because it springs from mants inner need of 
purgation and cleansing and has 8S a practical consequence, the 
feeling that the rottenness is cast out and the right order with 
God 1s restored. Man feels that all sham and hypocrisy are fin-
ished. The sin is honestly acknowledged. Man's conscious life 
31 8 1e.!!!., p. 44 • 
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proceeds in an aura of peace and satisfaction. These are the prac-
tical consequences which make confession of sins meaningful.)2 
Prayer is also to be evaluated empirically and pragmatically. 
Prayer is religion in act. In prayer the soul puts itself in a 
personal relation of contact with the mysterious Ideal Power ot 
which it feels the presence. It is the vital act by which the mind 
seeks to save itself by clinging to the divine. Prayer is a valid 
religious phenomenon because it has practical effects--at least 
in the mind of the one praying. A sick individual prays. He be-
lieves in God and 1s persuaded that help can come to him from on 
high. Tension is eased and the mind is more resigned as the con-
viction grows that divine power is there. Sometimes the body 
itself heals faster as a result of trustful prayer and confidence 
in the Ideal Power. "The fundamental religious point is that in 
prayer, spiritual energy, which othe~~ise would slumber, does 
• become active. and spiritual work of sbme kind is effected re-
ally_"» Prayer is, therefore, a valid religious experience since 
it has practical psychological or l~aterial effects which are ex-
perienced by the one praying. 
Prayer is religion in act. But what is religion itself when 
it is reduced to its simplest elements? Religion is the faith-
state; this includes both biological and psychological reactions 
)212ia• J pp. 462-463_ 
33Ib1d ., p. 477. 
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which constitute a powerful force by which men live. Religion or 
the raith-state may contain very little that can be called intel-
lectual content. The faith-state is sometimes nothing more than 
a half-spiritual enthusiasm and vague couraGe to fight the battles 
of lire. Frequently, however, a positive intellectual content or 
creed is associated with the passional faith-state. The intellec-
tual content "gets invincibly stamped in upon belief, and this ex-
plains the passionate loyalty ot religious persons everywhere to 
the minutest details of their so widely differing oreeds."34 This 
process, by which the intellectual creed is closely linked to the 
passionate faith-state; is one of the most important biological 
functions of mankind. It is important because it inspires a man 
to the point of extraordinary action and persevering endurance. 
The passional and emotional acceptance ot a religious creed acts 
both as a stimulant and as an anaesthetic. Man rests in and takes 
courage trom the conclusion that a God is there to make up tor the 
obvious helplessness and wickedness of man. God will satisfy every 
human need and longing. Man is thus not alone. God is always 
there--eternally useful for man. James favorably quotes Leuba on 
this idea of the usefulness of God being foremost 1n the mind of 
the religious believer: "The truth of the matter can be put in 
this ways God !§. not known, l!2. .u !l21 understood; h!a II used ... -some-
times as meat-purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as 
34 6 l!!!s!., p. 50. 
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friend. sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself 
useful, the religious consciousness asks for no mere than that.,,35 
Thus the actual psychological end of religion is not God, but life, 
a larger, richer and more satisfying life. 
The intellectual content or creed in all religious conscious-
ness inCludes the following two elements: the existence of a feel-
ing of uneasiness, and the existence of BOD1e solution for this 
uneasy feeling. Man feels uneasy in his life-situation and senseS 
that there is something wrong with hirr. as he naturally stands. 
Man is saved from this uneasiness or basic disorder by making 
proper connection \iith the higher powers in life. 1>1an is floun .... 
dering in the vast chaotic sea which we call life. God 1s the 
strong ship eminently useful for man in the chaos. NIan achieves 
his salvation by getting into contact with God. This vital con-
tact is primarily realized by the impulsive, non-intellectual and 
" 
courageous leap which James calls religious belief. Once man takes 
this momentous, live and forced leap. a vast spiritual anerry flows 
in to the personality; a new life opens out. Religious belief 
leads on to peace, equanimity, fortitude and sincere love. And 
[these are the solid practical effects which make religious belief 
~eaningrul and valid. 
Believe in God, says Jmnes, It is quite true that His exist-
ence cannot be logically demonstrated. Yet there is no need of a 
3SLeuba, quoted by James in Varieties, pp. S06-507. 
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logical demonstration in a matter of the feelings and heart. 
Belief in God will verify itself by the manifest fruits of peace 
and courage which follow. Ultimately, God exists not because He 
can be intellectually proved; God exists because His existence 
makes a difference of fact in human life. 
This 1s the first and last statement of James's religious 
pragmatism: "There is a God because His existence leads to certain 
practical consequences in my 11fe." In other words, pragmatism 
is the ultimate criterion of religious experience. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The exposition of James's religious pragmatism is now com-
plete. James's entire religious system rests upon the pragmatic 
norm. Philosophically, the system will stand or fall as the prag-
matic norm stands or falls. And the pragmatic norm does not stand. 
James said in the beginning of the Varieties that he was a 
psychologist and not a religious thinker. It is perfectly safe to 
agree with him on this point. His psychological descriptions ot 
man's experience of incompleteless, misery and desire for God are 
very well done. His philosophical explanation of the religious 
experience of man is, however, definitely pragmatic and cannot be 
accepted by the serious thinker. 
"That is true or valid which has, or can have a practical con 
sequence in man's life." This is the hypothesis of James, which, 
strange to say. is never specifically proven in any of his writ-
ings. He states the principle. He rewords the principle. He ap-
plies the principle to many different cases. But be never really 
establishes tbe validity of the principle itself. According to 
James.s own principles. the pragmatic norm itself is not perma-
nently immutable. It must be reinterpreted and applied in the 
oourse or man's experience. Try out the pragmatic norm, says 
James, and see if it does not meet all the requirements of human 
experience. 
The author of this thesis is forced to conclude that the prag-
matic norm does not meet all the requirements of human experience. 
The pragmatic norm is not universally true. In fact, it is not 
even partially true 1n the significant areas of scientific and 
philosophical thought where real knowledge is an end in itself. It 
i8 one thing to say that certain truths can have startling prac-
tical consequences. It is another (and false) thing to say that 
all truths must have personally realized practical consequences. 
James's basic error consists in failing to realize the following: 
a proposition or thing can be true without making a difference of 
tact to the individual person. A truth may have consequences; but 
the consequences do not make or const.itute the truth. 
A word must be added on James's theory of belief in God. He 
repeatedly maintains that the purely intellectual approach to God 
1s neither safe nor sufficient. One must follow the heart. One 
must follow the "non-intellectual" impulses leading to the Divin-
ity. This procedure would, perhaps, be valid it man's non-intel-
lectual impulses led direotly to God at all times and in all situ-
ations. That man's impulses do not always lead directly to God 
is a truth evident even to the beginner in psychology. It the 
reasoning nature of man does not help one in a philosophical ap-
proach to God. if man's intellect is not the stabilizing force in 
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the pressure ot life, then there is nothing left as a permanent 
foundation for human life. One cannot depend on the emotions, for 
they are in a constant state of flux. One cannot depend on the 
will alone, for it will settle on any sort of inferior good with-
out the direotion of Ule intellect. One cannot depend on the pas-
Sions, for they too frequently embrace the enticing pleasures of 
the present moment. 
In short, the intelleotual approach to God is the only reason-
able approach. God exists, not because I want Him to exist; God 
exists, not because I feel that His existenoe will make a differ-
enCe in the practical details of my life; but God exists as the 
intellectually perceived Cause of the visible world contacted day 
by day. 
James successfully demolished the idea that truth is a bare 
relation hanging unconnected 1n space. The only trouble with this 
accomplishment is that few, 1f any t of' the thinkt~rs of recent phil-
osophical history held such an opinion. Scholastic philosophy 
certainly does not hold it. One can safely agree with James when 
he says that truth is not a bare static relation hanging in space 
with no connection to the individual knower. To concede this, 
however, is not to establish tbe pragmatic method as the only 
other possibility. It is questionable whether James ever fully 
understood scholastic realism or epistemology. His caricature of 
the scholastiC teaching on objective evidence is amusing. but not 
based on fact. 
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Real epistemological truth--cojn1tive truth--is indeed con-
formity of the intellect with reality. This intentional or repre-
sentative conforffiity is a relation, but a relation with a definite 
subject, terminus and foundation. The subject of the truth-rela-
tion is the intellect acting according to its judging capacity; 
the terminus of the truth-relation is the reality to be actually 
known according to the existence proper to it; the foundation of 
the truth-relation is the torm of the known reality existing in 
the intellect. 
Thus truth has a relation to the individual person, but is 
not constituted by the individual's practical needs and desires. 
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